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I. INTRODUCTION
To its critics, Dillon's Rule is a common law rule that places a
straightjacket on municipal governments.2 Specifically, Dillon's Rule
is a rule dictating strict construction of municipal powers, by requiring
that all local powers must be clearly traceable to some unequivocal
and specific delegation from the state.' For example, given such a
strict construction standard under Dillon's Rule, one court reasoned
that a city's requirement of hot water in dwellings was "not necessarily
related" to a broader state legislative mandate for "sanitation" or to
"health and welfare" in such dwellings.4
In Nevada, during the 2005 Session of the Nevada Legislature, a bill
was introduced before the Senate Committee on Government Affairs
that would have abolished Dillon's Rule.5 That enterprising bill was
Senate Bill 427 (S.B. 427).6 In about two months, however, S.B. 427
died in that committee without any hearings pursuant to Joint Stand-
ing Rule No. 14.3.1, which allows further action to be taken on a bill
only if it moves "on or before the 68th calendar day of the legislative
session."7
Notwithstanding its procedural demise, S.B. 427 undoubtedly had
some supporters among the ranks of local government officials, who
desperately sought to put an end to Dillon's Rule.8 Moreover, these
Nevadans are not alone, as Dillon's Rule tends to be unpopular with
most municipalities across the nation, where local officials have also
introduced similar bills attempting to overturn Dillon's Rule.9 In-
deed, the growing opposition to Dillon's Rule is a national phenome-
non.10 So, as a practical matter, what causes such bills to fail?
2. See, e.g., Hearing on Assem. B. No. 9 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 1995
Leg., 68th Sess. (Nev. 1995) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Betsy Fretwell, pleading with
the Nevada Legislature to repeal Dillon's Rule), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/68th/min-
utes/AGA210.txt; see also Michael A. Wood, The Propriety of Local Government Protections of
Gays and Lesbians from Discriminatory Employment Practices, 52 EMORY L.J. 515 (2003).
3. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990).
4. Early Estates, Inc. v. Hous. Bd. of Review, 174 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I. 1961) (emphasis
added).
5. See S.B. 427, 73rd Leg. Sess. (Nev. 2005), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/73rd/
Reports/HistListBills.cfm?DoctypeID=2 (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
6. See id. In its initial draft, S.B. 427 was designed to abolish Dillon's Rule only with regard
to Nevada counties.
7. Nev. Leg. J. Standing Rule No. 14.3.1, available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/72nd/
SrJoint.cfm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
8. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 2; see also Wood, supra note 2.
9. See, e.g., VA. ASS'N OF COUNTIES, SUMMER CONFERENCE: BLUEPRINT FOR TOMORROW
(2005), available at www.vaco.org/sitefiles/pdfs/front%20page/summerconference-issues%20sur-
vey%20report.pdf.
10. See id; see also Wood, supra note 2.
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There are at least two reasons. First, in abolishing Dillon's Rule,
municipal officials are, in fact, implicitly asking their state legislators
to forfeit some of their legislative powers and hand over those for-
feited powers to local officials."1 Second, municipalities may lack the
lobbying apparatus to overcome a natural legislative reluctance to
self-imposed limits on state power and authority. As such, any bill
seeking to limit Dillon's Rule could lead to difficult debates at best,
lack of action or an impasse at worst.
Nevertheless, there have also been successes. In some cases, in at-
tempting to grant greater authority to municipal governments, some
state legislatures have abolished or limited the sweep of Dillon's Rule
in their jurisdiction.12 In other cases, courts have come to the conclu-
sion that municipal powers should no longer be "strictly construed,"
as required by Dillon's Rule.13 Instead, these courts have overturned
Dillon's Rule and, to empower local officials, have also avowed to
"liberally construe" municipal powers in the future under a less re-
strictive model.14
In that context, the purpose of this article is to take a critical look at
Dillon's Rule and to examine the background and implications of the
debate on municipal power. Specifically, this article will examine and
analyze the historical background, legal framework, and policy ratio-
nale for that policy debate and attempt to provide some recommenda-
tions to help address the obstacles and challenges associated with
Dillon's Rule.
In particular, Part II of this article will briefly review the evolution
of municipal governance from the days of the Roman Empire to early
Colonial America. Part III will study the circumstances surrounding
the birth of Dillon's Rule in nineteenth century America. Part IV will
analyze the inner workings of Dillon's Rule and its most extreme ap-
plications. Part V will provide a case study on the municipal land-
scape in Nevada. Part VI will analyze Nevada case law under Dillon's
Rule. Parts VII and VIII will analyze the national arguments for and
against Dillon's Rule. Part IX will look at some of the practical ef-
fects of Dillon's Rule and its competing model of local governance.
Lastly, Part X will attempt to provide a pragmatic synthesis of the
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See Michael Monroe Kellog Sebree, Comment, One Century of Constitutional Home
Rule. A Progress Report?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 155, 156 (1989) (stating that the movement away
from Dillon's Rule began in the United States in 1875 with a constitutional provision in the
Missouri Constitution to allow home rule).
13. See G. Roth Kehoe II, City of New Orleans v. Board of Commissioners: The Louisiana
Supreme Court Frees New Orleans from the Shackles of Dillon's Rule, 69 TUL. L. REv. 809
(1995).
14. See id.
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various countervailing policy arguments as a basis for updating the
current framework in Nevada and elsewhere.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: FROM THE ROMAN EMPIRE TO
COLONIAL AMERICA
The English word municipality comes from the Latin word
municipium.'5 To the ancient Romans, municipium meant a Roman
city that could freely govern its own affairs subject only to the author-
ity of Rome. 6 Indeed, the city-state was the earliest form of modern
government that was initially organized in places like Mesopotamia,
Asia Minor, and around the Mediterranean. 17 Rome itself also
started out as a city-state, until through a series of mostly successful
wars, it grew into a massive empire. 8
Notwithstanding Roman desires for world domination, municipia,
especially given the slow methods of transportation and communica-
tion of the time, were logical and natural seats of power.19 They al-
lowed those who best knew local conditions to exercise power and
control over local affairs.2" Indeed, this form of government was so
successful that it even survived the fall of the Roman Empire.2 '
In the fifth century, once the Western Roman Empire fell, many of
her former municipia remained successfully functioning semi-autono-
mous political entities. 22 In the early middle ages, some of them be-
came incorporated into "fiefdoms," where typically a local nobleman
exercised control over his fiefdom from his manor or stronghold.23
He knew the local people, and understood the local threats and
opportunities.24
Similarly to those Roman emperors who came before him, however,
some of these noblemen began to thirst for greater glory and power.
Through a series of wars, larger kingdoms arose from smaller fiefdoms
15. See Diane Lang, Dillon's Rule and the Birth of Home Rule, THE MUN. REP. (N. M. Mun.
League, Sante Fe, N. M.), Dec. 1991, at 1, available at http://www.nmml.org/Dillon.pdf.
16. See id.
17. See RAFAEL SEALY, A HISTORY OF THE GREEK CITY STATES 700-338 B.C. (Univ. of
California Press 1976).
18. See LEON HoMo, ROMAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FROM CITY TO STATE (THE His-
TORY OF CIVILIZATION) (KeGan Paul 1929).
19. See Lang, supra note 15.
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Padova a Historical Outline and Growth of the City, available at http://
www.cbft.unipd.it/pdtour/history.html (last visited March 23, 2007). See ROSAMOND McKrrER-
ICK, THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES: EUROPE 400-1000 (SHORT OXFORD HISTORY OF EUROPE) (Ox-
ford Univ. Press 2001).
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Lang, supra note 15.
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in France, Spain, and Britain, for example. 25 Notwithstanding such
consolidation of power, however, smaller political entities such as bor-
oughs or shires, as in England, continued to retain a great deal of local
control. 26 It was not until nation-states arose in Europe beginning in
the eighteenth century, often in the form of disastrous dictatorships,
that dictators and national governing bodies either eliminated or sig-
nificantly reduced the power of local authorities.27
In sharp contrast, in colonial America, English municipal govern-
ments continued to serve as a model, as colonial governors granted or
chartered various municipal corporations or boroughs.2 These bor-
oughs enjoyed some level of independence from colonial legislatures.
After the Revolutionary War, cities and towns were formed by act of
the state legislature. Those that existed before the Revolution contin-
ued, for the most part, to operate under their existing charters. New
municipalities were created by the state legislature adopting a special
or local law establishing a separate charter for each municipality. Even
though, in theory, the state legislature retained direct control over mu-
nicipalities, by custom the actual control was lax, primarily due to the
fact that the count[r]y was still largely rural. Prior to 1820, there were
no cities with a population of over 50,000. These fledgling cities did
not yet engage in large-scale activities that merited extensive concern
by the state legislature. In fact, local laws often reflected the lack of
municipal services and activity (e.g., there were laws against animals
running at large but pigs were often exempted because they ate the
garbage in the streets). With relatively few functions performed by cit-
ies, not much regulation was necessary by the state.
Thus, as a practical matter, the autonomy of municipalities was not
a contentious issue in Colonial America nor in the early days of the
Republic.
III. AMERICA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND THE BIRTH OF
DILLON'S RULE
As the United States experienced an explosive population growth in
the nineteenth century, primarily as a result of massive waves of immi-
gration from Europe, the size of American cities also grew by leaps
and bounds.30 In particular, the industrial revolution not only made it
25. See Free University Online, http://www.freeuniv.com/lect/rankin/UnitlA.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 30, 2007).
26. See Lang, supra note 15.
27. See D.G. WILLIAMSON, THE AGE OF THE DICTATORS: A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN
DICTATORSHIPS, 1918-53 (Longman Pub. Group 2007).
28. See Lang, supra note 15.
29. Id. at 2.
30. See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 1101-02 (Eric Foner & John A.
Garraty eds., 1991).
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possible for large population centers to form, it also created a huge
demand for a concentrated workforce to work in the factories.31 As a
result, the birth of the modern American city was virtually inevita-
ble.3" By the middle of the nineteenth century, New York, Boston,
and Philadelphia, for example, all became major population centers.33
During this time, academics began to debate the best approach to
city governance.34 In particular, three academic viewpoints existed on
municipal governance: Dillon's Rule, the Cooley Doctrine, and the
Fordham Rule.35
Dillon's Rule, as will be discussed in further detail below, mandated
a strict construction of municipal powers, given that municipalities are
deemed creatures of the state.36 The Cooley Doctrine, on the other
hand, held that localities are not creatures of the state but have inher-
ent powers.37 Lastly, the Fordham Rule, while mandating a more lib-
eral construction of municipal powers, still held that such powers
should be devolved from the state.38
From the early twentieth century, the Cooley Doctrine was discred-
ited.39 The Fordham Rule also faded from name-specific use.4" Dil-
lon's Rule, on the other hand (notwithstanding its straightjacket
approach to municipal power), gained wide popularity and acceptance
throughout the state courts.4 '
Specifically, the reason for the wide acceptance of Dillon's Rule is
that, during this era, cities and city governments were widely per-
ceived as corrupt.42 As one author noted, "The municipal govern-
ments were . . . not well organized ... and ... public improvements
did not function well. This made them easy victims for political ma-
chines and local bosses that led to a widespread and fundamental cor-
ruption in municipal government. Cities came to be viewed as the core
of all that was wrong with society. ' 43
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See Jim Williams & Randolph Horn, Local Self Government in Alabama, 33 CUMB. L.
REV. 245, 246-249 (2002-2003).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Lang, supra note 15.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
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Against this backdrop, in 1868, Iowa Chief Justice John Forrest Dil-
lon first pronounced his views on municipal governance in Clinton v.
Cedar Rapids.4 4 Specifically, he opined that:
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers
and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the
breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may
destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is
some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a
single act, if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a
wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the
State, and the corporation could not prevent it .... [Municipalities]
are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.45
Subsequently, Iowa Chief Justice Dillon further explained that, as a
result of such political paradigm, municipal corporations should have
the authority to
exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in
express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident
to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accom-
plishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, -
not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, sub-
stantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the
courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.4 6
In short, Dillon's Rule, a judge-made doctrine,47 stands for the rule
of strict construction of municipal power, a presumption against the
existence of independent authority, demanding that, to be valid, an
exercise of a local power must clearly be traceable to some unequivo-
cal and specific delegation from the state.48
IV. THE EXTREMES OF DILLON'S RULE VERSUS THE AUTONOMY
OF HOME RULE
Notwithstanding the emergence of Dillon's Rule as the traditional
majority view, since its inception, Dillon's Rule also had a large num-
44. Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, 24 Iowa 455 (Iowa 1868).
45. Id. at 475. This state court decision was never appealed. See id. While the courts have
quickly embraced Dillon's Rule, the first court case to speak of "Dillon's Rule," by using an
explicit reference to Judge Dillon (i.e., Iowa Chief Justice Dillon), was a Florida Supreme Court
case. See Duval County v. Charleston Lumber & Mfg. Co., 33 So. 531, 536 (Fa. 1903) (Carter,
J., dissenting); see Pacific R. Co. v. City of Leavenworth, 18 F. Cas. 953 (C.C.D. Kan. 1871) (No.
10,649) (discussing the power of the legislature over private and public or municipal corpora-
tions).
46. 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-50
(5th ed. 1911); see also Merriam v. Moody's Ex'r, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (Iowa 1868).
47. This judge-made state court doctrine originated from those inferences that Iowa Chief
Justice Dillon was able to make from the structure of state and local governments. See Cedar
Rapids, 24 Iowa at 475.
48. See Briffault, supra note 3.
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ber of critics.49 Recognizing such dissatisfaction, legislatures, and in
some cases courts, have created a competing model of municipal gov-
ernance known as "home rule". 50 Home rule was an idea that ap-
pears, in part, to trace its origins to the Roman municipium, the
English borough, and the Fordham Rule.5
To better understand the exacting strictness of Dillon's Rule, it is
helpful to begin with a comparative overview of home rule. Home
rule refers to the concept of municipal autonomy or self-government
and it has been adopted in some forms in a significant number of
states. 2 Specifically, the state grants such home rule powers to the
citizens of a local area to structure, organize, and empower their own
local government.53 As explained by one commentator:
[In sharp contrast to Dillon's Rule,] home rule has its underpinnings
in notions of popular sovereignty. In other words, the theory is that
government power should stem from the individual, and local govern-
ment officials are better suited to observe the individual's judgments
about how his interests ought to be served and to give them effect. It has
been said that "the ideal of home rule is defined as the ability of a
local government to act and make policy in all areas that have not
been designated to be of statewide interest through general law, state
constitutional provisions, or initiatives and referenda." 54
Home rule powers are generally exercised in four areas: "structural
(form of local government); functional (powers of local government);
fiscal (revenue sources, tax rates, borrowing, and related local func-
tions); and personnel (employment, remuneration, collective bargain-
ing, and related matters)."5'  Thus, home rule allows local
governments to determine their own affairs, without having to rely
upon a state statute to authorize the specific exercise of a particular
power or action.56 Home rule, in effect, reverses Dillon's Rule be-
cause a local unit of government may exercise wide-ranging powers
despite a lack of specific statutory authority.5 7
49. See, e.g., Hearing supra note 2; see also Wood, supra note 2.
50. See Sebree, supra note 12, at 156 (stating that the movement away from Dillon's Rule
began in the United States in 1875 with an amendment to the Missouri Constitution to allow
home rule); see also Kehoe II, supra note 13.
51. See supra Parts II and Il1.
52. See LEGIS. COUNSEL BUREAU, Bulletin No. 03-3, Incorporation of Towns, at 11 (Nev.
2003) [hereinafter Incorporation of Towns J, available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/lcb/research/
03InterimReports/BulletinO3-03.pdf.
53. See id.
54. Wood, supra note 2, at 518 (citing HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HAND-
BOOK 1-2 (Dale Krane et al. eds., 2001)) (emphasis added).
55. See Incorporation of Towns, supra note 52, at 11. (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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In direct contrast, Dillon's Rule places a straightjacket on municipal
governments as it requires that local power must be clearly traceable
to some unequivocal and specific delegation from the state. 8 Courts,
applying Dillon's Rule, will thus place the strictest limits on the exer-
cise of municipal power, even if such exercise may concern such mun-
dane decisions as matters related to upgraded health and safety
codes5 9 or some added benefits to families of municipal personnel.6 °
In particular, Early Estates, Inc. v. Hous. Bd. of Review and Arling-
ton County v. White, illustrate some of the more extreme applications
of Dillon's Rule. In Early Estates, Inc., the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, implicitly applying the strict construction of Dillon's Rule, in-
validated an ordinance mandating installation of hot water in all kitch-
ens and bathrooms.61
More specifically, in that case, the Rhode Island Legislature vested
the city council with authority to establish certain minimum standards
for dwellings.62 In particular, the state enabling act provided that cit-
ies had the authority to provide "minimum standards governing the
conditions, maintenance, use and occupancy of dwellings and dwelling
premises deemed necessary to make said dwellings and dwelling
premises safe, sanitary and fit for human habitation."63
Notwithstanding such broad grant of authority by the Rhode Island
Legislature, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the city's re-
quirement for dwellings to connect its kitchen sinks, lavatory basins,
and bathing facilities to hot water lines exceeded the city's authority
under that enabling act.64 Specifically, the court reasoned that, as a
matter of strict construction, hot water was "not necessarily related to
sanitation or public health and welfare . . . [in such dwellings]."65
Similarly, in Arlington County, the Virginia Supreme Court, apply-
ing the strict construction of Dillon's Rule, also arrived at a decision
that demonstrates a great level of discomfort with unbridled municipal
action. Specifically, the court invalidated a city's action extending cov-
erage under its self-funded health insurance plan to unmarried domes-
tic partners of employees.66 Perhaps more surprisingly, the court
reached that decision, despite a fairly-broad authorization by the Vir-
58. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 2; see also Wood, supra note 2.
59. See Estates, Inc. v. Hous. Bd. of Review, 174 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I. 1961).
60. See Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706, 712-13 (Va. 2000).
61. See Early Estates, Inc., 174 A.2d at 119.
62. See id. at 120.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 119.
65. Id.
66. See Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706, 712-13 (Va. 2000).
9
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ginia Legislature for a local government to provide such health benefit
programs for municipal employees and their "dependants. '67
Specifically, the Virginia Legislature authorized "a local govern-
ment to provide self-funded health benefit programs for its employees
and their dependants."6 s Notwithstanding that authorization, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court reasoned that, as a matter of strict construction,
an "unmarried domestic partner" was, in most cases, merely "finan-
cially interdependent" and, as such, should not be covered by the
city's self-funded health insurance plan as a "dependant.
' 69
In short, Dillon's Rule appears to allow judges to second-guess the
policy decisions of local officials. By way of contrast, in a home rule
city, courts would be reluctant to second-guess a city's authority to
provide appropriate health and safety codes, such as the requirement
of hot water, or grant benefits to the families of municipal employees,
regardless of marital status.7°
V. A TRADITIONAL STATE: THE NEVADA MUNICIPAL LANDSCAPE
According to the authors of Nevada Politics and Government. Con-
servatism in an Open Society, because of the apparently contradictory
provisions of Nevada's constitution and laws, the charter cities in Ne-
vada really could not be described as home rule cities.71 On the one
hand, the Constitution of the State of Nevada grants limited home
rule powers to local governments.72 Specifically, the Constitution of
the State of Nevada provides:
The legislature shall provide for the organization of cities and towns
by general laws and shall restrict their power of taxation, assessment,
borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit, except
for procuring supplies of water, provided, however, that the legislature
may, by general laws, in the manner and to the extent therein pro-
vided, permit and authorize the electors of any city or town to frame,
adopt, and amend a charter for its own government, or to amend a
charter for its own government, or to amend any existing charter of
such city or town.73
67. See id.
68. Id. at 708.
69. See id. at 709.
70. See Kehoe II, supra note 13.
71. See DON W. DRIGGS & LEONARD E. GOODALL, NEVADA POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT:
CONSERVATISM IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 176 (1996); see also LEGIS. COUNSEL BUREAU, Bulletin
No. 15, Home Rule in Nevada, at 8 (Nev. 1952), http://www.leg.state.nv.us/lcb/research/1953In-
terimReports/Bulletin015.pdf (stating that "new modern, streamlined, general statutes may be
necessary in order to provide real home rule"); Hearing, supra note 2.
72. NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 8.
73. Id.
10
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Thus, the seeds of home rule power, subject to legislative imprima-
tur, have been sown. On the other hand, the Nevada Legislature has
only enacted very limited home rule powers, and legal authorities
have consistently applied Dillon's Rule to all cities and counties in
Nevada, as will be discussed further below.7 4
By way of background, Sections 266, 267, and 268 of the Nevada
Revised Statutes allow local citizens to establish three distinct forms
of municipal city governments.75 Each of these sections incorporates
some very limited features of home rule governance.76
For example, Section 267 permits voters of an incorporated city to
change to a commission form of city government without legislative
approval.77 This is a limited, structural form of home rule power that
the legislature granted pursuant to the Nevada Constitution.78 Sec-
tion 268 establishes a procedure for the voters of an incorporated city
to amend the city's charter without legislative approval.79 This is also a
very limited home rule power.80 Something more closely resembling
real home rule power, however, is only granted in Section 266.81 Nev-
ertheless, this power is also limited under the statute, constitution, and
case law.8 2
At present, six of Nevada's smaller cities, including Mesquite, oper-
ate under Section 266.83 The remaining incorporated cities, including
several larger Nevada cities, operate under special charter enacted by
the Nevada legislature.8 4 In all cases, however, based on existing case
law and Attorney General Opinions, all Nevada cities appear to be
operating under and subject to Dillon's Rule. 5
For Nevada counties, Nevada Revised Statutes Sections 243, 244,
244A, and 245 provide the basic political and legal framework.8 6 Simi-
larly to Nevada cities, Nevada counties also cannot be called home
rule jurisdictions.87  Instead, counties such as Clark County, the
74. See infra Part VI.
75. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 266-68 (2006).
76. Id.
77. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 267.020 (2006).
78. See id.
79. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 268.010 (2006) (describing the petition powers).
80. See id.
81. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 266.010 (2006) (subjecting home rule-power to state legislative
oversight).
82. See infra Part VI.
83. See LEGIS. COUNSEL BUREAU, Bulletin No. 99-18, Legislative Commission's Study of
City Charters, at 1-3 (Nev. 1999), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/lcb/research/InterimRe-
ports/99-18.html.
84. See id.
85. See infra Part VI.
86. See NEV. REV. STAT. chs. 243, 244, 244A & 245 (2006).
87. See, Hearing, supra note 2.
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county in which the Las Vegas metropolitan area is located, is also
subject to Dillon's Rule.88
Nevada, however, is by no means atypical. As Dillon's Rule states,
Nevada's municipal political paradigm is certainly closely aligned with
that of thirty-nine other states.89 Nevertheless, as more and more
courts and legislatures begin to follow a home rule model for some or
all of their municipalities, Nevada, as a pure Dillon's Rule state, may
become part of a shrinking minority.9"
VI. NEVADA AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF DILLON'S RULE
As set forth in the footnotes, Nevada legal authorities, often with-
out explicit reference to the name of the rule, have repeatedly applied
Dillon's Rule to all cities and counties.91 The leading case in Nevada
on municipal power is Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas.92 In that case, the
Nevada Supreme Court explained:
[Miunicipal corporations have no powers but those which are dele-
gated to them by the charter or law creating them . . . [Plowers ex-
pressly given and the necessary means of employing those powers
constitute the limits of their authority. It is conceded that beyond this
they have no existence, and can do no act which the law can recognize
as valid and obligatory upon them .... [Because] a municipal corpora-
tion... is but the creature of the legislature, and derives all its powers,
rights and franchises from legislative enactment or statutory implica-
tion .... the only power a municipal corporation possesses and can
exercise are: (1) [t]hose granted in express terms; (2) those necessarily
or fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; and(3) those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the munici-
pality, not merely convenient, but indispensable .... Any fair, reason-
able, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved
88. See infra Part VI.
89. See Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Meghan Zimmerman Gough & Robert Puentes, Is Home
Rule the Answer? Clarifying the Influence of Dillon's Rule on Growth Management (2003), http://
www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/dillonsrule.pdf.
90. See Kehoe II, supra note 13.
91. See, e.g., Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 2000-10 (March 8, 2000) (opining that a county "can
exercise only those powers that are expressly granted to it by law, or by such implication as are
reasonably necessary to carry out the express powers"); see also Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 2001-26
(Sept. 25, 2001) (opining that all state and local officials are limited to the exercise of powers
which are expressly delegated by the Legislature or which are necessarily implied in order to
permit the exercise of expressly delegated authority); Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 2001-02 (Feb. 1, 2001)
(applying Dillon's rule to Mesquite, a Section 266 city); Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 99-31 (Sept. 8,
1999) (applying Dillon's Rule to Mesquite); Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 99-24 (July 20, 1999) (holding
similarly with respect to Lander County); Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 92-1 (Feb. 3, 1992); see generally
State ex rel. Joseph Rosenstock v. S.T. Swift, 11 Nev. 128 (1876) (stating that a "municipal cor-
poration . . . is but the creature of the legislature, and derives all its powers, rights and franchises
from legislative enactment or statutory implication"); City of Reno v. Sam Saibini, 83 Nev. 315
(1967) (holding similarly).
92. Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas, 65 P.2d 133 (Nev. 1937).
12
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by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied ....
Thus, [n]either the ... [municipal] corporation nor its officers can do
any act, or make any contract, or incur any liability, not authorized
thereby, or by some legislative act applicable thereto. All acts beyond
the scope of the powers granted are void.93
In some cases, however, Nevada's application of Dillon's Rule has
been more flexible or amorphous than the foregoing discussion would
suggest. For example, in a gaming matter, a Nevada Supreme Court
found that broader powers existed in the municipality by implication,
notwithstanding the strict requirements of Dillon's Rule.94 As the
Ronnow court also hinted:
While a strict construction should be applied to the grant of powers to
municipalities ... , yet if the power is clearly implied, it should not be
impaired by a strict construction. A strict construction must yet be a
sensible construction and be based upon the entire context. Or, as it is
sometimes put, the power given by a charter is a matter of reasonable
construction.
95
Therefore, powers "reasonably inferable" from the powers ex-
pressly granted would likely be permissible to be exercised by the mu-
nicipal government.96 Stated differently, while the Nevada Supreme
93. Id. at 136 (quoting Rosenstock v. Swift, 11 Nev. 128, 140 (1876); citing 1 EUGENE MC-
QUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 367, 365 (2nd ed. 1928) and 1 JOHN FORREST DILLON,
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911)).
94. See, e.g., Nevada v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Las Vegas, 1 P.2d 570, 572 (Nev. 1931) (stating
that "[t]he power to restrict the number of [gaming] licenses in the city is ... a very necessary
implication from the power to license and regulate gambling").
95. Ronnow, 65 P.2d at 136. (emphasis added). With respect to the general state of munici-
pal law, the leading treatise stated the following on implied powers:
In addition to powers conferred on municipal corporations by express enumeration in the
constitution, statutes or charter, it is beyond dispute that municipal corporations possess
certain implied ... powers .... Such implied powers include, and are generally held to be
limited to the following: 1. Powers necessarily arising from those expressly granted, and also
those reasonably inferred from the powers expressly granted. 2. Powers essential to give
effect to the powers expressly granted .... [For example, the] municipal corporation may
adopt or employ devices, agencies, instrumentalities, or other means for the purpose of
carrying out powers expressly conferred on it, although the particular means adopted is not
expressly authorized. The corporation cannot, however, under this rule enlarge or extend
the powers expressly granted. 3. Powers recognized as indispensable to local civil govern-
ment to enable the municipality to fulfill the objects and purposes for which it was organ-
ized and brought into existence .... [Such] power must be indispensable as distinguished
from merely useful or convenient .... [Furthermore, the] necessary implication of the mu-
nicipal power must be so clear and strong as to render highly improbable that the legislature
could have entertained an intention contrary to that implication .... [Lastly,] there can be
no implied powers independent of express powers, or in conflict with express powers.
2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.13 (3rd ed. 1996).
96. In Nevada, legal authorities have implied certain powers to municipal corporations. For
example, in one case the Nevada Supreme Court held that "[t]he power to restrict the number of
[gaming] licenses in the city is ... a very necessary implication from the power to license and
regulate gambling." Bd. of Comm'rs of Las Vegas, 1 P.2d at 572; see also Nev. Op. Att'y Gen.
2001-02 (Feb. 1, 2001) (opining that, under the general principles discussed above, the City of
Mesquite may form a non-profit corporation to facilitate the development of a proposed power
13
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Court has paid homage to the central tenants of Dillon's Rule, it ap-
pears to have created a "sensible construction" or "reasonable con-
struction" standard for municipalities at least in the Ronnow case.9 7
Subsequently, the application of Dillon's Rule also appeared to be
somewhat context specific, as the above-referenced gaming decision
illustrates. 98 Nevertheless, Dillon's Rule still allows a judge to second-
guess a municipality's policy choices and actions, using his or her "sen-
sibilities" to determine what may "reasonably" be implied under a
given set of circumstances. 99
Additionally, in Nevada, as elsewhere, it is not completely clear
what precise value custom may have for interpreting implied powers
or to what extent judges may take into consideration the changing
reality of the twenty-first century city. With regard to the value of
municipal customs in interpreting implied powers, one leading treatise
stated as follows:
Ordinarily, custom or usage cannot of itself confer power on a munici-
pal corporation. For instance, unlawful expenditures of money cannot
be rendered valid by long-continued usage .... However, general and
long-continued usage may be resorted to in aid of a proper construction
of the charter or statute, if the uniform practice has continued for a
considerable period of time .... [Specifically,] [piractical construction
of a doubtful charter provision will be followed where such construc-
tion by the municipality has been acquiesced in generally and acted on
by third persons in good faith, so as to preclude the municipality from
denying such construction. This rule is limited to the irregular exercise
of corporate power, and cannot be extended to an enlargement of mu-
nicipal powers so as to include authority that the city did not legally
possess.' 00
generating plant authorized by state law, even without expressing any reliance on a home-rule
power).
97. See Ronnow, 65 P.2d at 136.
98. See Board of Comm'rs of Las Vegas, 1 P.2d at 572 (stating that "[t]he power to restrict
the number of [gaming] licenses in the city is... a very necessary implication from the power to
license and regulate gambling").
99. See, MCQUILLIN, supra note 95, at § 10.13.
100. Id. at § 10.17 (emphasis added). In a somewhat different context, a Nevada court has
opined as follows:
Where property rights have been built up in reliance upon an erroneous construction of a
statute by public officers, or where overturning such a construction would unsettle many
important laws .... [such] considerations sometimes press quite heavily upon the courts,
especially if the true construction was really doubtful. But where such is not the case, and
where the statute is clear ... [such construction must not continue] ... no matter how long
... [it has been in existence].
Nevada v. La Grave, 42 P. 797, 797 (Nev. 1895).
14
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Finally, in the twentieth century, government has undergone a revo-
lutionary change at the federal, state and local levels.'01 While courts,
in general, continue to rely on nineteenth century ideals to interpret
government powers, the scope and power of government at all levels
have grown exponentially.1
0 2
For example, cities in Nevada are providing services today that were
inconceivable a few generations ago.103 As early as 1952, a govern-
ment publication recognized that "[i]n Nevada, it appears that cities
and counties have gradually expanded their functions in varying de-
grees, but roughly in accordance with the national trend. As an exam-
ple, the City of Reno carried on nineteen activities in 1909; by 1950
this number had grown to sixty-six activities, an increase of more than
247 percent."'0 4
It remains to be seen whether courts will be willing to acknowledge
that reality by adjusting those doctrines that are used to interpret local
government powers. In a 1980 study, Nevada ranked near the bottom
of all fifty states in municipal discretionary authority.10 5 Thus, an argu-
ment can be made Nevada has outgrown Dillon's Rule or, at least,
that it has outgrown its most conservative formulation. 10 6 At the same
time, notwithstanding a leaning toward strict construction in at least
some areas, as the foregoing discussion demonstrates, uncertainties
remain. Unfortunately, there are no recent Nevada court decisions
that exhaustively address this issue, and, therefore, a somewhat amor-
phous version t°7 of the majority strict Dillon's Rule remains the
101. LEGIS. COUNSEL BUREAU, Bulletin No. 15, Home Rule in Nevada, at 1 (Nev. 1952),
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/lcb/research/19531nterimReports/Bulletin0l5.pdf (noting the explo-
sion of growth in government services at the local level).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. Richardson, supra note 89, at 27.
106. See infra Part VII.
107. See, e.g., Nevada v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Las Vegas, 1 P.2d 570, 572 (Nev. 1931) (allowing
greater discretion in gaming matters). Moreover, the Nevada Legislature has granted broader
powers to certain municipalities in some areas, in a direct attempt to counter the negative effects
of Dillon's Rule. For example, it was not always clear that a municipality can use its licensing
provisions to raise revenue. In particular, municipalities did not previously have the power to
impose a tax on real estate developers in the guise of licensing fees. See, e.g., Nev. Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 85-26 (1985) (opining that, if a town collects licensing fees "for purposes other than the
recoupment of regulatory expenses, the charge imposed may actually be a tax, which would be
outside the town's authority;" emphasis added); see also Clark County v. City of Los Angeles,
265 P.2d 216 (Nev. 1954) (holding that county did not have the power to collect excessive license
fees for revenue purposes). More recently, however, the Nevada Legislature appears to have
expanded the revenue collection powers of Nevada counties. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.335
(2006) (setting forth that "Except as otherwise provided in ...[sections not relevant to the
Developer Tax, Nevada counties shall have the power to] fix, impose and collect a license tax for
revenue or for regulation, or for both revenue and regulation, on ... trades, callings, industries,
occupations, professions and business") (emphasis added).
15
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law of Nevada."°8
VII. POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST DILLON'S RULE
Commentators have fashioned a long list of arguments against Dil-
Ion's Rule and in favor of home rule, i.e., greater municipal autonomy.
These arguments can be briefly summarized into six groups.
First, Dillon's Rule creates uncertainty. 0 9 In particular, every time
local officials adopt a new ordinance, they have to speculate whether
courts will strike them down as an infringement of Dillon's Rule.110
Thus, a removal of Dillon's Rule would mean reduced judicial inter-
ference in local policymaking and administration. 11
Second, Dillon's Rule could prevent municipal officials from
quickly reacting to unique local problems with specifically tailored lo-
cal solutions.'12 Thus, Dillon's Rule may stifle local responsiveness,
experimentation, and innovation. 13
Third, on a closely-related note, state legislatures are often not fully
informed on unique local conditions." 4 Thus, a state legislature's
"one size fits all solution" may be inappropriate for a specific local-
ity.11 5 In sharp contrast, home rule allows local citizens to address
their own problems in their own unique way. 16 For example, with a
removal of Dillon's Rule and adoption of home rule, the local electo-
rate could more freely decide what shape their local government
should take and its necessary administrative arms and powers. 117
Thus, in a home rule state, state officials would be less likely to dictate
an artificial structure of local governance. 18
Fourth, also on a related note, Dillon's Rule may prevent munici-
palities from providing higher quality services than permitted by the
state legislature." 9  As such, Dillon's Rule forces uniform
mediocrity.120
Fifth, when state legislatures impose unfunded mandates on munici-
palities, given Dillon's Rule, municipalities may be unable to find a
108. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 2.
109. See Richardson, supra note 89, at 14-15.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
16
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revenue source to fund those mandates. 121 In sharp contrast, home
rule allows greater control of finances at the local level, thereby plac-
ing greater responsibility on local elected officials whose spending
mistakes may be more detectable by the local electorate.122
Lastly, Dillon's Rule may also be a source of government waste. 123
For example, "local bills [could] constitute as much as 20 to 25 percent
of the legislature's workload. 1 12 4 Thus, instead of spending more time
on statewide issues, the legislative focus may be squandered on
smaller issues, when such local issues would more efficiently and ap-
propriately be addressed at the local level. 1 5 At the same time, every
time there is a new issue that must be addressed, Dillon's Rule forces
municipalities to hire lobbyists to beseech their state legislators for
added local powers to address those issues.126
VIII. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR MAINTAINING DILLON'S RULE
Dillon's Rule also has a number of persuasive supporting argu-
ments. These arguments can also be grouped into six categories.
First, Dillon's Rule may lead to greater uniformity. 127 Specifically,
by having state legislatures, instead of local authorities, control the
larger framework, localities are more likely to enact uniform, or near
uniform, laws.1 28 Such uniformity ensures economic growth by al-
lowing corporations to spread their sphere of influence more readily
throughout the state, without having to fear inconsistent legal obliga-
tions.1 29 The uniformity afforded by Dillon's Rule also helps to en-
sure that the provision and delivery of public services remains
consistent throughout the state.130
Second, state agencies often have greater budgets and technical ex-
pertise than local agencies.131 If local units make their own policy,
they might be deprived of greater expertise and resources available at
the state level and could also lose the cost savings associated with a
statewide agency.' 3 2
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
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Third, Dillon's Rule leaves most of the financial decision making
powers at the state level.'33 Home rule, on the other hand, allows
municipalities to undercut the revenue base of state governments. 34
If each municipality is responsible for using its own finances to solve
its own problems, disparate income distribution patterns may also
leave some poorer municipalities unable to address some of their
problems. 135
Fourth, state oversight, through the judicial application of Dillon's
Rule, may prevent exclusionary and provincial actions by local gov-
ernments. 136 For example, home rule may allow local officials to act
in an arbitrary and capricious fashion. 137 Stated differently, as local
officials, with their increased powers, may favor political friends and
disfavor political enemies, violations of due process and equal treat-
ment under the law may increase. 38
Fifth, dissatisfied citizens of a municipality may increasingly appeal
to the state legislature to address their problems. 139 This may force
state legislatures to ultimately spend just as much time on local affairs
under the home rule model as under the Dillon's Rule model.' 4 °
Lastly, if one were to do away with the "strict construction" stan-
dard of Dillon's rule and replace it with a "liberal construction" stan-
dard, such standard could still afford the opportunity for legal
challenges and the concomitant uncertainty that comes with such
challenges. 14
1
IX. EXAMPLES OF THE MODELS AT WORK
Before briefly examining the persuasive merits of the academic ar-
guments cited above, it is important to make three basic observations
about the realities of municipal governance. First, reality is often more
complex than the academic arguments for or against Dillon's Rule are
willing to acknowledge. 42 Second, the quality of leadership probably
may have a much greater practical effect on effective municipal gov-
ernance than any of the legal frameworks discussed above. 43 Lastly,
if the past is any indication of future results, greater government pow-
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Richardson, supra note 89, at 34.
143. See John Leo, Ray Nagin, the error-prone mayor, USNEWS.CoM, Sept 21, 2005, http://
www.usnews.com/usnews/opinion/articles/050921/21 leo.htm.
18
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ers and services almost invariably have resulted in greater taxation on
the citizenry. 144
With regard to the first observation, a scholarly article reached the
following conclusion about municipal management and the role of
Dillon's Rule and home rule in managing urban growth, one of the
most critical issues that municipalities face today:
[A] careful review of the evidence suggests that attributions of growth
management failure to Dillon's Rule (or a lack of home rule) reflect
an overly simplistic understanding of Dillon's Rule, home rule, and
growth management. Such a view relies on the faulty assumption that
more local government autonomy leads to more effective growth man-
agement. Both theory and practice suggest the opposite. Ultimately,
each state legislature bears responsibility for the allocation of author-
ity between state and local governments-and in large part deter-
mines land use outcomes. More importantly, effective growth
management requires adherence to a set of broad principles designed
to accommodate growth rather than limit or ration it-as is often the
case in the name of growth management on the local level. Dillon's
Rule neither prohibits nor hinders adherence to each of these growth
management principles. Dillon's Rule, in a word, probably has almost
no affect on growth management activity.'4 5
With regard to the second observation, the recent tragic events in
New Orleans also appear to provide some evidence that the quality of
leadership probably has a much greater practical effect on effective
municipal governance than Dillon's Rule or home rule.146 As one ar-
ticle noted about the events in New Orleans, a home rule city:147
New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin made every conceivable mistake dur-
ing the crisis. With plenty of warning, he delayed the evacuation order,
had no drivers ready to operate the school buses that stood idle, failed
to stock the Superdome with food and water, and let the looters ram-
page without any interference from police. The excuse given for the
failure to get buses moving was that the mayor ... [was not] able to
round up enough drivers. One report said most drivers were women
and afraid to make the trip. But a competent mayor would have or-
dered the drivers to report and provided an armed on-board protector
for each bus. 1 4 8
With regard to the final observation that greater government pow-
ers almost invariably have resulted in greater taxation on the citizenry,
there is ample evidence to support that view. As one publication
144. George Nastas and Stephen Moore, A Consumer Guide to Taxes: How Much Do You
Really Pay in Taxes?, Cato Institute Briefing Paper (April 15, 1992), available at http://www.cato.
org/pubs/briefslbp-015.html.
145. Richardson, supra note 89, at 34 (emphasis added).
146. See Leo, supra note 143.
147. See Kehoe II, supra note 13.
148. Leo, supra note 143.
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noted: "In 1960 middle-income Americans paid less than 30 percent of
their earnings in local, state, and federal taxes; today that figure is up
to 40 percent. Furthermore, many middle- and upper-income families
living in the states that have the highest taxes, such as New York and
California, pay nearly half their incomes in taxes." '4 9
X. A SUGGESTED SYNTHESIS
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, despite strong academic ar-
guments against Dillon's Rule, strong justifications can also be found
for its continued existence. 150 Moreover, the theoretical proposition
that all municipal powers are derived from the state also appears to
have wide support and acceptance. 5' In sharp contrast, as noted
above, about a dozen states have utilized home rule models, models
that have eviscerated the principle that all local powers must be
clearly traceable to the state and permitted "liberal construction" of
municipal powers in most areas of local governance. 52
Similarly to these "all-or-nothing" practical approaches, most of the
existing scholarship on the Dillon's Rule debate also takes a one-sided
view. On the one hand, a large number of authors and commentators
take the view that Dillon's Rule is tragically misguided and must im-
mediately come to an end. 53 On the other hand, there are also sev-
eral authors that have vehemently argued for the continued use of
Dillon's Rule or have argued that Dillon's Rule, in the final analysis,
makes no difference. 54
In light of the revolutionary changes to the reality of the twenty-
first century city and that cities are no longer the nests of extreme
corruption as they once may have been during Chief Justice Dillon's
time, some changes are warranted.155 Unlike most opponents of Dil-
lon's Rule, however, this article will merely argue that only modest
changes are necessary and that all powers should still be devolved
from the state. As will be discussed below, the all-or-nothing ap-
149. George Nastas and Stephen Moore, A Consumer Guide to Taxes: How Much Do You
Really Pay in Taxes?, Cato Institute Briefing Paper (April 15, 1992) available at http://www.cato.
org/pubs/briefs/bp-015.html; see also David Keating, A Taxing Trend: The Rise in Complexity,
Forms, and Paperwork Burdens, National Taxpayers Union Policy Paper (Apr. 17, 2006) availa-
ble at http://www.ntu.org/main/press-papers.php?PresslD=829&org-name=NTU (lamenting
that the increase in the tax law's complexity alone had added roughly 1 billion hours in annual
paperwork burdens over the last 10 years).
150. See supra Parts VII, VIII, and IX.
151. See, e.g, Clinton v. Cedar Rapids, 24 Iowa 455, 475 (Iowa 1868) (emphasis in original);
see also Richardson, supra note 89.
152. See Richardson, supra note 89.
153. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 2; see also Wood, supra note 2.
154. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 89.
155. See supra Part VI.
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proaches could each present their own potential set of problems in
certain areas of municipal action.
Specifically, this article argues that the across-the-board "strict con-
struction" Dillon's Rule standard should only be modified so that (A)
municipal structural and personnel powers should be construed under
a "liberal construction" standard; (B) municipal functional powers
should be construed under a "reasonable construction" standard that
also strongly considers custom; (C) only municipal fiscal powers
should be construed under a "strict constriction" standard; and (D)
state legislatures should also consider granting broader emergency
powers to municipalities, as such may be required for municipalities as
first responders to any crisis.
As a note of reference, by "strict construction," it is meant that a
power must either be "expressly stated or necessarily and strictly re-
lated" to those powers expressly stated. By "reasonable construc-
tion," it is meant that a power must be "expressly stated or reasonably
related" to those powers expressly stated and its reasonableness
would also be evaluated based on the customary nature of such
power. And, by "liberal construction," it is meant that a power must
be "expressly stated or fairly and possibly related" to those powers
expressly stated.
A. Structural and Personnel Powers -Liberal Construction
Recommended
As noted above, "structural powers" are those powers that allow
municipal corporations to decide on the best form of local govern-
ment. 156 For example, pursuant to a municipality's structural powers,
the local electorate may decide that they would prefer a commission
form of government.'57 "Personnel powers" are those powers that al-
low municipal corporations to make decisions regarding employment
of, remuneration for, and collective bargaining with city employees. 158
As a matter of policy, a liberal construction of structural and person-
nel powers is the best approach for the reasons discussed below. First,
the local electorate should have significant freedom in deciding on the
specific structure of their local government that best responds to their
needs. Such freedom is consistent with, as well as dictated by, the
principles of a more democratic government. a59 Second, liberal con-
156. See Incorporation of Towns, supra note 52, at 5.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. Wood, supra note 2, at 518 (citing HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HAND-
BOOK 1-2 (Dale Krane et al. eds., 2001)) (emphasis added). Proponents of this principle often
also argue that the disconnect between decision makers and the electorate should be reduced by
21
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struction of structural and personnel powers would also significantly
lower, albeit not completely eliminate, the risk (and, thus, the fre-
quency) of a legal challenge of such powers in court, as potential liti-
gants would be less likely to believe that they could prevail against the
municipality in these areas.'
60
At the same time, and perhaps most significantly, municipal corpo-
rations must compete with private corporations in two important
ways . 61 First, they compete for the same pool of qualified employ-
ees. 161 Second, in an ideal world, they should also perform nearly as
efficiently as the private sector.
Unlike private corporations, however, municipal corporations do
not currently enjoy the same sweeping freedoms in amending their
"charters and bylaws" or making employment decisions. 163 In particu-
lar, as the Arlington County case illustrates, unlike a private corpora-
tion, a municipal corporation, in some cases, will be second-guessed
by a court regarding its ability to offer a competitive benefit package
to all prospective employees.164
Thus, when it comes to structural and personnel powers, the strict
construction standard of Dillon's Rule actually undermines a munici-
pal government's ability to function more responsively, more effi-
ciently, and more competitively.165
In response to some of those arguments that proponents of Dillon's
Rule typically raise, it should also be noted that, with regard to struc-
tural and personnel powers, such pro-Dillon's Rule policy arguments
are not very persuasive. 166 For example, with regard to structural and
personnel powers, neither state expertise nor state-wide uniformity is
a concern.1 67 Instead, for the reasons already noted above, location-
specific structural and personnel solutions based on local needs is the
more desirable outcome, as local officials are in a better position to
transferring decision making authority to governmental bodies that are closest to the electorate.
See id.
160. See Richardson, supra note 89, at 14-15.
161. See generally Wash. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 093 (July 15, 1953) (explaining that, in con-
tracting for a certain highly specialized labor, strict construction does not make sense, as we are
not dealing with a very general grant of powers to a municipal corporation "created to govern in
any such sense as in the case of a county or a city, but [one that is created] to engage in purely
proprietary undertakings in direct competition with private corporations or individuals engaged
in the same business").
162. See id.
163. See supra Part IV.
164. See See Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706, 712-13 (Va. 2000).
165. See Richardson, supra note 89, at 14-15.
166. See id.
167. See id.
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understand and respond to the local administrative and employment
environment. 168
As a legal matter, the legal framework in Nevada is already in place
that either the Nevada Supreme Court or the Nevada Legislature
could change course and permit a "liberal construction" of structural
and personnel powers of municipal corporations. First, the Nevada
Constitution does not prohibit such construction. 169 Second, as noted
above, Nevada Revised Statutes Sections 266, 267, 268 all contain
structural powers that already appear to exceed the strictest limits of
Dillon's Rule.170 Lastly, Dillon's Rule, as any other judicial common
law creation, may also be subject to modification with the changing
times. 17
1
B. Functional Powers -Reasonable Construction Recommended
As noted above, "functional powers" are the general powers of lo-
cal government. 172 In contrast to structural and personnel powers that
are exercised internally by the municipal entity, functional powers are
exercised externally to that entity.173 Specifically, functional powers
may include such public works projects as contracting with the lowest
bidder for the building of a sewer system in a new subdivision or such
community safety functions as maintaining a police department. 74 In
addition to such core functional powers, a municipality may, for exam-
ple, also maintain a park or a library.175
Nevada courts, most likely unintentionally, have already begun to
modify the strictest formulation of Dillon's Rule by adopting a more
pragmatic approach. 176 Specifically, the classical, strictest formulation
of Dillon's Rule required that municipal corporations exercise the fol-
lowing powers and no others:
First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or
fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third,
those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and pur-
poses of the corporation, -not simply convenient, but indispensable.
168. See id.
169. NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 8.
170. See supra Part V.
171. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897)
(stating that "It is revolting to have no better reason for a [construction] of law than that [it was
so] laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and [that construction] simply persists from blind imitation
of the past").
172. See Incorporation of Towns, supra note 52, at 5.
173. See id.
174. See Lower Paxton Township Supervisors, http://www.lowerpaxton-pa.gov/government/
supervisors/supervisors.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
175. See id.
176. See supra Part VI.
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Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of
power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power
is denied.' 77
Under this strict formulation, as noted above, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court went on to hold that the city's requirement for dwellings
to connect its kitchen sinks, lavatory basins, and bathing facilities to
hot water lines exceeded the city's authority under that state's ena-
bling act. 178 Notwithstanding a vigorous dissent, the court reasoned
that, as a matter of strict construction, hot water was "not necessarily
related to sanitation or public health and welfare . . . [in such
dwellings].' 79
In sharp contrast, Nevada courts, while still vowing to follow Dil-
lon's Rule, have adopted a more moderate and sensible approach to
applying that rule, by explaining that they would use a "sensible" or
"reasonable" approach to construing implied municipal powers.18 °
This trend can be demonstrated in three distinct areas: (1) the lan-
guage of some court opinions; (2) practical applications; and (3) cer-
tain interpretations provided by other state officials.
First, as noted above, the Nevada Supreme Court pronounced its
view on Dillon's Rule as follows: "A strict construction must yet be a
sensible construction and be based upon the entire context. Or, as it is
sometimes put, the power given by a charter is a matter of reasonable
construction .... 181
Second, unlike the inflexibility shown by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, the Nevada Supreme Court reasoned that: "[t]he power to re-
strict the number of . . . [gaming] licenses in the city is . . . a very
necessary implication from the power to license and regulate gam-
bling."18 It is unlikely that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would
have reached the same generous conclusion. 83 For example, that
Court may have found that the municipality merely had the power to
grant or deny licensing applications, but not to engage in economic
legislation by creating a less-competitive environment by limiting the
number of licensees in that locality.
Lastly, other official interpretations similarly demonstrate a more
moderate, laissez-faire approach to construing municipal powers. For
example, as one Nevada Attorney General Opinion reasoned: a mu-
177. DILLON, supra note 46, at 449-50; see also Merriam v. Moody's Ex'rs., 25 Iowa 163, 170
(Iowa 1868).
178. Early Estates, Inc. v. Hous. Bd. of Review, 174 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I. 1961).
179. See id.
180. See supra Part VI.
181. Ronnow, 65 P.2d at 133 (emphasis added).
182. Bd. of Comm'rs of City of Las Vegas, 1 P.2d at 572.
183. Cf. Early Estates, Inc., 174 A.2d at 119.
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nicipality "[can also exercise those powers that] by... implication...
are reasonably necessary to carry out the express powers"' 18 4
Building on such subtle signs of moderation in Nevada precedent
(which also exist in other jurisdictions), 85 this article will argue fur-
ther below that, with regard to functional powers, courts and legisla-
tures should further depart from a "strict construction" standard of
Dillon's Rule to a "reasonable construction" standard. At the same
time, this article will argue that, with regard to functional powers, a
"liberal construction" standard of home rule is also not warranted, as
it may prove to be an excessive grant of authority with regard to pow-
ers that are exercised externally to the municipal entity.
First, "strict construction" is not warranted as it will likely lead to
absurd results, such as the decision pronounced by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court.186 In particular, the extreme limits established by the
Early Estates, Inc. case seem inappropriate for any twenty-first cen-
tury city. Given the vast number of functional roles assumed by mu-
nicipal entities, they cannot afford to have all of their community-
related decisions strictly scrutinized in the courts.1 87
Most importantly, with regard to its functional powers, municipali-
ties can be analogized to administrative agencies.' 8 8 For example, in
those instances where a legislature perceives a new general problem
and grants certain powers to its municipal governments to more spe-
cifically address that problem, then the individualized and localized
functional solutions that are implemented by the municipalities are in
fact administrative solutions. Specifically, in acting upon those gen-
eral functional powers that the legislature bestowed upon it, the mu-
nicipality is acting as a political body analogous administrative agency
and should be entitled to similar deference.1 89
At the same time, a "liberal construction" of functional powers is
also not warranted for two reasons. First, functional powers, unlike
structural and personnel powers, are exercised externally to the mu-
nicipal entity and, as a result, could have greater impact on the com-
184. Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. No. 2000-10 (May 1, 2000) (emphasis added).
185. See supra Part IV; see also Richardson, supra note 89.
186. Cf. Early Estates, Inc., 174 A.2d at 119.
187. LEGIS. COUNSEL BUREAU, Bulletin. No. 15, Home Rule in Nevada at 1 (Dec. 1952)
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/lcb/research/19531nterimReports/BulletinOl5.pdf (noting the explo-
sion of growth in government services at the local level); see also Richardson, supra note 89, at
14-15.
188. See Guide to Government Home page, http://www.guidetogov.org/ca/state/overview/
municipal.html (last visited March 28, 2007).
189. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc, 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (setting forth the classical formulation of broad administrative discretion by holding that,
unless the Legislature has directly spoken to the precise issue in question, courts should defer to
agencies on pure questions of statutory interpretation, as long as the agency arrived at a reasona-
ble or permissible construction of the statute).
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munity.' 90 For example, such unchecked external powers could lead
to significant state-wide variations in the delivery of public services. 191
In these instances, only the state legislature is able to keep such harm-
ful variances in check by setting certain minimum thresholds and pro-
viding a uniform system of regulation. 92 With "liberal construction,"
however, such legislative control becomes more difficult or impossi-
ble. 193 Second, a "liberal construction" standard could also lead to
potentially unchecked activities that in the realm of administrative law
are called "arbitrary or capricious. "194
Accordingly, given that both the "liberal construction" and the
"strict construction" standards present their own set of concerns,
courts and legislatures should insist upon a middle-of-the-road "rea-
sonable construction" standard. Specifically, on the one hand, such
standard should not insist on the strictest relationship and the tightest
fit between an implied power and those powers expressly granted,
and, on the other hand, such standard also should not give free reign
to potential excesses.
Fortunately, unlike Rhode Island courts, Nevada legal authorities
have already begun to move in the direction of "reasonable construc-
tion" by seizing upon the "fairly implied" language in Dillon's Rule.195
This article argues that they may want to directly acknowledge this
direction and their willingness to hold the functional powers of munic-
ipalities to a less exacting review. It is difficult, of course, in some
circumstances to say what is "reasonable." For example, is it reasona-
ble, pursuant to a more general power for "public welfare" in the mu-
nicipality's charter, to operate a park?
In this analysis, custom should provide greater guidance to a court.
Custom, i.e., "long-continued usage," after all is often evidence of
what worked successfully in the political laboratories of local govern-
ance and what the expectations of the state and of the local electorate
are vis-d-vis the municipality. As such, custom is eminently valuable in
evaluating "reasonableness," and powers customarily exercised should
receive great deference.
C. Fiscal Powers -Strict Construction Recommended
As noted above, "fiscal powers" are those powers that allow munic-
ipal corporations to determine their revenue sources, tax rates, and
190. Richardson, supra note 89, at 14-15.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See supra Part VI.
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borrowing. 196 Stated differently, fiscal powers are all related to how a
municipality funds itself.197 For instance, pursuant to its fiscal powers,
a municipality may decide to raise additional revenue by increasing a
certain tax.
198
In sharp contrast, spending powers, i.e., how a municipality spends
its resources, should, of course, be analyzed in the context of the other
powers discussed in this article. For example, when the municipality
spends money on remuneration for city employees, such spending is a
''personnel power" or when the municipality spends money on a new
sewer system for a subdivision, such spending is a "functional
power. "199
As a policy matter, however, it is advisable to continue with a strict
construction of fiscal powers, i.e., municipal funding. Specifically, for
the three basic reasons noted below, there is a strong public policy
interest in making certain that a municipality only raises its revenue,
either through increased taxes or borrowing, in strictly monitored
ways.
First, the unfortunate reality is that, year after year, the average tax-
payer pays more and more money in taxes.20 0 By continuing the strict
construction tradition of Dillon's Rule, this trend is kept in check to a
large extent. Second, strict construction also helps to ensure that mu-
nicipalities do not significantly undercut either the state or the federal
tax base.01
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, as this article argues for
"liberal construction" of structural and personnel powers and "rea-
sonable construction" for functional powers for enhancing the auton-
omy and effectiveness of municipal corporations, a strict construction
of fiscal powers will remain a vital check on municipal spending that
may otherwise spiral out of control without such "counterbalance" in
place.
Thus, when it comes to fiscal powers, the continued use of a strict
construction standard that was developed under Dillon's Rule will
help to ensure better monitoring, controlling, and limiting of poten-
tially excessive revenue collection efforts by municipalities.
196. See Incorporation of Towns, supra note 52, at 5.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. Cf supra Part X. A-B.
200. George Nastas and Stephen Moore, A Consumer Guide to Taxes: How Much Do You
Really Pay in Taxes?, Cato Institute Briefing Paper (April 15, 1992), available at http://www.cato.
org/pubs/briefsfbp-015.html (last visited March 27, 2007).
201. See Richardson, supra note 89, at 14-15.
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In response to some of the arguments that the opponents of Dillon's
Rule typically raise in this regard,2 °2 it should also be noted that, with
regard to fiscal powers, most of those arguments are not very persua-
sive. For example, with regard to fiscal powers, a greater legal uncer-
tainty of "strict construction" is actually healthy, as it helps to keep
municipal revenue raising efforts in greater check. In particular, such
fear and uncertainty will probably create somewhat of a bottleneck in
municipal revenue raising, thereby contributing to reduced govern-
ment waste.
At the same time, pursuant to more liberally contoured spending
powers as outlined above, in the areas of personnel or functional pow-
ers, such spending powers will still allow municipalities to exercise a
considerable amount of discretion. Thus, to the extent that municipal-
ities wish to provide greater services in some areas or lesser services in
others, municipalities are not tethered to the lowest common denomi-
nator of the state. Furthermore, municipalities could still, of course,
raise additional revenues under state authorized schemes. Most im-
portantly, however, the strict construction standard will leave the ulti-
mate revenue raising powers of any municipality in the hands of the
state.
As a legal matter, Nevada, for example, is well positioned to con-
tinue with a strict construction of fiscal powers. First, the Nevada
Constitution appears to directly endorse such an approach. In partic-
ular, the Nevada Constitution specifically provides, "The legislature
shall.., restrict... [municipal] 20 3 power of taxation, assessment, bor-
rowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit, except for
procuring supplies of water .... "204 In sharp contrast, there are no
other strict directives in the Nevada Constitution with regard to any of
the other municipal powers discussed in this article.20 5 Second, case
law in most jurisdictions, as in Nevada, generally indicates that courts
are not in favor of broadly read or applied tax schemes.20 6 Lastly,
even S.B. 427, which would have terminated the application of Dil-
202. See id.
203. NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (The text of the Nevada Constitution in this section only
expressly references cities and towns).
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., Fair Lanes Inc. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 210 A.2d 821, 823 (Md. 1965) (hold-
ing that, if a tax statute is doubtful in its scope, it should be construed most strongly in favor of
the citizen and against the state); see also State v. Pioneer Citizens Bank of Nevada, 456 P.2d
422, 423-424 (Nev. 1969) (holding that tax statutes will not be extended by implication); see
generally Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that an administra-
tive agency's litigating positions regarding the meaning of a statute are not entitled to
deference).
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Ion's Rule in Nevada, °7 expressly provided that "This section does not
authorize a [local government] to impose or increase a tax unless the
tax or increase is otherwise authorized by specific [state] statute.208
D. Emergency Powers -Broad Powers Recommended
The final important role assumed by municipalities is as "first re-
sponders." In this role, municipalities exercise certain important func-
tions that may be termed "emergency powers." 0 9 Such emergency
powers may include the obvious immediate disaster relief.210 For ex-
ample, should a disaster occur in the Las Vegas Valley, Clark County
officials, with other municipal first responders, would coordinate
emergency relief efforts from the Clark County Government
Center.211
In addition to such obvious immediate steps in both dealing with an
aftermath and preparing for a disaster, there are larger emergency
powers that may need to be exercised by a municipality. Given the
unique challenges facing local governments as "first responders" dur-
ing a large scale disaster, governments should also be creative in both
their pre- and post- disaster approaches.2
In this unique realm, municipalities should exercise broad discre-
tionary emergency powers to tackle large disasters.213 As a result, all
state legislatures applying Dillon's Rule should study: (1) whether mu-
nicipalities have sufficiently broad powers to address larger concerns
that require creativity; and (2) whether Dillon's Rule may contribute
to any problems in the areas related to disaster relief. Nevertheless,
the issues and problems associated with disaster relief are multifari-
ous, extremely complex and require solutions at various levels of the
government that are simply beyond the scope of this article and, thus,
will necessitate further analysis.214
207. In its initial draft, S.B. 427 was designed to abolish Dillon's Rule only with regard to
Nevada Counties. See S.B. 427, 73rd Sess (Nev. 2005), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/
73rd!Reports/history.cfm?ID=2293.
208. Id.
209. Officials gear up for major terrorism exercise in Nevada, RENO GAZETrE-JOURNAL ON-
LINE July 11, 2003, available at http://www.rgj.com/news/printstory.php?id=46725 (last visited
Feb 11, 2007).
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See Abdul Malik Mujahid, Out of Box Thinking Needed to Save Lives in Kashmir Earth-
quake, http://soundvision.com/info/poor/quakeideas.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
213. See id.
214. As one article noted:
The Las Vegas Valley's readiness for a major emergency could be hampered by inadequate
funding and misplaced resources .... [In particular,] Nevada received $28.4 million from
the federal government, of which Clark County received a little more than half during the
current fiscal year. Those dollars are just not enough to meet the security needs of Southern
Nevada, said Tim McAndrew, emergency management coordinator for the city of Las
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XI. CONCLUSION
Despite strong academic arguments to the contrary, home rule is
not the ultimate panacea for all the ills of municipal governance, as
strong justifications can still be found for the continued existence of
Dillon's Rule. Specifically, as this article argued, "liberal construc-
tion" of all municipal powers goes too far. At the same time, in light
of the revolutionary changes to the reality of the twenty-first century
city, a series of modest changes to Dillon's Rule are needed and ap-
propriate. For the reasons noted above, a limited overhaul of the Dil-
lon's Rule framework appears to be the best solution for Nevada and
elsewhere.
Specifically, with regard to their structural and personnel powers,
municipal corporations should enjoy freedoms similar to those en-
joyed by private corporations. With regard to their functional powers,
municipal corporations should enjoy freedoms similar to those en-
joyed by administrative agencies. With regard to their fiscal powers,
however, municipal corporations should expect an exacting review
from the courts, similar to a review that any untested and expansive
tax interpretation may receive.
Vegas. "In fiscal year '05, regionally, we identified in excess of $79 million, just shy of $80
million in projects, and we were funded with $17 million," he said. "These things we needed
were respirator suits in the field for firefighters all the way up to vital infrastructure." That
underfunding has left the various agencies and municipalities in Clark County working to-
gether to meet needs on an installment basis, McAndrew added. In one case, an order for
emergency vehicles specially equipped to respond to nuclear, chemical, biological and radio-
logical disasters was cut in half. Local fire departments will now make do with six of the
trucks for shared use instead of the dozen requested. Las Vegas is facing the same problem
gripping many other major cities around the country. The Department of Homeland Secur-
ity's allocation formula is based on population instead of actual risk. Las Vegas, which is full
of high-profile potential targets, operates under the same per-capita funding formula as ru-
ral Elko. The nearly 40 million tourists visiting Las Vegas this year are not factored into the
equation.
Valerie Miller, Use of Homeland Security dollars questioned (Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://
www.lvbusinesspress.comarticles/2005/10/04/news/newsO4.txt (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).
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